Add disk/zuse.img + bleach_zuse_img.sh: first-boot mint testing (Phase 8)
Resolves the acl_pinned punch-list item's open question: credential data (ZUSE-CERT-LO/HI, ACL-CA-KEY-LO/HI) are CONSTANT words, i.e. real DictEntrys, and acl_pinned's enforcement (vm_create_word()'s unconditional shadow-refusal for any pinned name) already covers this generally -- no new flag needed, zuse.4th's ACL-ZUSE-BOOT already pins both cert constants today. That investigation surfaced a real gap: ACL-ZUSE-BOOT pins the cert constants unconditionally on every boot, before any legitimate mint could ever run, permanently locking in the 0 placeholder on the very first boot. This directly shaped Captain Bob's next design pass: a dedicated zuse.img test thumbdrive, "bleachable" back to pristine state for repeated first-boot testing; a one-time mint-then-pin flow (fixing the gap above); a separate ongoing S" name" MINT word for minting additional regular users; and an explicitly-deferred Zuse recovery path question. This commit is the first piece: disk/zuse.img (64MB blank, matching the existing USB-fixture convention) + scripts/bleach_zuse_img.sh (idempotent reset). Verified live via QMP hotplug -- reads back as HOMEBLOCKS_SIG_BLANK, correctly simulating a genuine first boot. Deliberately flat/raw, not GPT-partitioned, matching homeblocks_sig_check()'s current sig_start_fblock=0 assumption; both move to a real GPT-relative offset together once a parser exists. No kernel code touched -- host-side test tooling only, no 3-arch acceptance boot needed. Still open: the mint-then-pin boot fix, the MINT word, Zuse recovery. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CXjAPTEKrgY2Mrk25KoLDn
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Claude Sonnet 5
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@@ -265,11 +265,44 @@ decisions get added here, not to `FABRIC-2.md`. Follow the same discipline `FABR
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Conservation intact, no panic. Clean zero-warning compile and clean boot on all three
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architectures.
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- [ ] Extend `acl_pinned`'s one-way-ratchet mechanism (already exists, already proven, just
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needs applying) to gate zuse credential minting specifically — confirm whether this
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literally reuses the existing `acl_pinned` bit on some relevant `DictEntry`, or needs its
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own analogous one-way flag on the credential data itself (the credential isn't a dictionary
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word, so the existing bit may not directly apply — open question, not yet resolved).
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- [x] **Resolved (2026-08-26): reuse `acl_pinned` directly, no new flag needed.** The open
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question assumed credential data "isn't a dictionary word" — but the design already chosen
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for it (`ZUSE-CERT-LO`/`HI`, `ACL-CA-KEY-LO`/`HI`) are `CONSTANT` words, i.e. real
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`DictEntry`s. `acl_pinned`'s enforcement is more general than assumed: `vm_create_word()`
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(`dictionary_management.c:394-404`) — the single choke point every word-defining construct
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goes through — unconditionally refuses to let *anything* shadow a pinned name ("Pin is
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permanent: no word may shadow a pinned entry — ever, by anyone"), a real general
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redefinition guard, not just an ACL-mode-change lock. `zuse.4th`'s `ACL-ZUSE-BOOT` already
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pins both cert constants today — the mechanism is already wired for this.
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**Real gap surfaced along the way, not yet fixed:** `ACL-ZUSE-BOOT` self-activates and pins
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`ZUSE-CERT-LO`/`HI` unconditionally on *every* boot — before any legitimate minting step
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could ever run, permanently locking in the `0` placeholder on the very first boot. The boot
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sequence needs to distinguish "already minted, pin it" from "not yet minted, don't pin yet"
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before minting can work at all.
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**This directly shaped the next design pass (2026-08-26, Captain Bob):** a dedicated
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`disk/zuse.img` QEMU test thumbdrive, "bleachable" back to pristine/unminted state for
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repeated first-boot testing; a one-time first-boot mint-Zuse flow (mint → write real cert →
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blow the fuse → *then* pin, resolving the gap above); a separate, ongoing `S" name" MINT`
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word for an authenticated Zuse session to mint additional regular users; and a Zuse recovery
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path, explicitly flagged as unresolved and risky if rushed — not to be designed casually,
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since the earlier "no software recovery, mint a new one" rule existed specifically to close
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a hole a careless recovery path could reopen.
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**First piece implemented (2026-08-26): the `zuse.img` bleach mechanism.**
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`disk/zuse.img` (64MB, blank, matching the existing USB-fixture convention exactly — see
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`disk/README.md`) + `scripts/bleach_zuse_img.sh` (idempotent reset back to blank). Verified
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live: hot-attached via QMP (same method as the warn-and-refuse verification above) — reads
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back as `HOMEBLOCKS_SIG_BLANK` (`xhci: USB drive not recognized (blank or foreign media)`),
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correctly simulating a genuine first boot. Deliberately flat/raw, not GPT-partitioned,
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matching `homeblocks_sig_check()`'s current `sig_start_fblock=0` call site — both move to a
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real GPT-partition-relative offset together once a parser exists, not attempted here. No
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kernel code touched this step (host-side test tooling only), so no 3-arch acceptance boot
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needed — single live amd64 QMP-hotplug confirmation is the right verification tier.
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**Still open, not attempted:** the mint-then-pin boot-sequence fix itself, the `MINT` word,
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and the Zuse recovery path.
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### From FABRIC-2.md §X, Milestone 5 — Console/VM key-match binding
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