First attempt shelled out to `openssl pkeyutl -sign` (fork/execlp, not system() -- avoided shell string interpolation of the key path). Corrected on request: no new external host binary dependency when the repo's own code can do the job -- same standing preference as the earlier anti-file correction. Rewritten to link ed25519_sign() (already verified against OpenSSL in Phase B) directly into mkcapsule. New tools/pkcs8_ed25519.c: a narrow DER walker (same shape as x509_ed25519.c, deliberately not shared -- small enough that duplicating a few TLV-walking lines beat threading a header between the kernel crypto tree and host tooling) extracting the raw seed from the intermediate's PKCS#8 private key, plus a minimal self-written base64 decoder (PEM is openssl genpkey's default output; no decoder existed anywhere in the repo). Verified end-to-end before wiring anything in: the extracted seed's derived pubkey matches the cert's exactly, and a full self-contained sign+verify round-trip (zero openssl) passes. CapsuleDesc had no spare bytes, so signatures live in a new parallel CapsuleSigEntry array, emitted by a new `mkcapsule --sign-key <path>` flag (omitted/missing key -> has_sig=0 everywhere, graceful, not a build failure -- CI has no access to the offline key). New capsule_sig.c/.h: capsule_verify_signature(), a separate function, not folded into the already-tested capsule_validate(). Finds and caches the embedded intermediate cert's pubkey once per boot, then verifies against it. Wired into all three capsule_validate() call sites in capsule_birth.c via log_message(LOG_WARN, ...) -- never refuses yet, per the earlier staged-rollout decision. Verified independently, both directions, live in the real kernel: a full clean build (38 signed capsules) boots clean on all three architectures with zero warnings. Separately, hand-corrupted one byte of Mama's own init.4th capsule's stored signature (not its payload/hash, which capsule_validate() already catches and would have masked the test) and rebuilt just the changed object: produced exactly "capsule sig: init.4th: INVALID -- signature does not verify" on boot, and the kernel still reached ok> -- proving warn-only doesn't refuse anything yet. Reverted before the final, untampered 3-arch acceptance pass. Still open: flipping WARN to hard-refuse (separate, deliberate step) and the BLOCK_MAP.md signature-status column. Documented in FABRIC-3.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U14ET9CWAtbQMbYqomKgXd
173 lines
6.3 KiB
C
173 lines
6.3 KiB
C
/* pkcs8_ed25519.c -- see pkcs8_ed25519.h. */
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#define _GNU_SOURCE /* memmem() */
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#include "pkcs8_ed25519.h"
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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/*
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* `openssl genpkey` writes PEM (base64 text between BEGIN/END markers)
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* by default, not raw DER -- accept either transparently rather than
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* requiring callers to pre-convert with an external tool (consistent
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* with this file's whole point: no new host binary dependency). A small,
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* self-contained base64 decoder, since none existed anywhere in this
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* repo to reuse (checked 2026-08-26).
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*
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* Returns a malloc'd DER buffer (caller frees) and sets *der_len, or
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* NULL if this doesn't look like a well-formed PEM block. Decodes only
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* the FIRST "-----BEGIN ... -----" / "-----END ... -----" pair found;
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* good enough for a single private key, not a general PEM bundle parser.
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*/
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static int b64_val(uint8_t c) {
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if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') return c - 'A';
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if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') return c - 'a' + 26;
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if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0' + 52;
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if (c == '+') return 62;
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if (c == '/') return 63;
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return -1; /* not a base64 char (newline, '=', etc.) */
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}
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static uint8_t *pem_to_der(const uint8_t *pem, size_t pem_len, size_t *der_len_out) {
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const char *begin_marker = "-----BEGIN";
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const char *end_marker = "-----END";
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const uint8_t *begin = memmem(pem, pem_len, begin_marker, strlen(begin_marker));
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if (!begin) return NULL;
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const uint8_t *line_end = memchr(begin, '\n', (size_t)(pem + pem_len - begin));
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if (!line_end) return NULL;
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const uint8_t *body_start = line_end + 1;
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const uint8_t *end = memmem(body_start, (size_t)(pem + pem_len - body_start),
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end_marker, strlen(end_marker));
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if (!end) return NULL;
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/* Decode base64 chars between body_start and end, skipping anything
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* that isn't a valid base64 character (newlines, stray whitespace). */
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size_t max_out = (size_t)(end - body_start); /* over-allocate, safe upper bound */
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uint8_t *out = malloc(max_out ? max_out : 1);
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if (!out) return NULL;
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size_t out_len = 0;
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int acc = 0, nbits = 0;
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for (const uint8_t *p = body_start; p < end; p++) {
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int v = b64_val(*p);
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if (v < 0) continue; /* skip newlines and '=' padding */
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acc = (acc << 6) | v;
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nbits += 6;
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if (nbits >= 8) {
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nbits -= 8;
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out[out_len++] = (uint8_t)((acc >> nbits) & 0xFF);
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}
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}
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*der_len_out = out_len;
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return out;
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}
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typedef struct {
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const uint8_t *p;
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size_t len;
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} der_span_t;
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/* Same short-form/long-form DER TLV walker as x509_ed25519.c's der_next()
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* -- see that file's comment for the full rationale. Bounds-checked
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* against limit at every step; refuses malformed input, never faults. */
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static int der_next(const uint8_t **cursor, const uint8_t *limit,
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uint8_t *tag_out, der_span_t *content_out) {
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const uint8_t *p = *cursor;
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if (p >= limit) return -1;
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uint8_t tag = *p++;
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if (p >= limit) return -1;
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uint8_t len_byte = *p++;
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size_t len;
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if (len_byte & 0x80u) {
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uint8_t nbytes = (uint8_t)(len_byte & 0x7Fu);
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if (nbytes == 0 || nbytes > 4) return -1;
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if ((size_t)(limit - p) < nbytes) return -1;
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len = 0;
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for (uint8_t i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) len = (len << 8) | *p++;
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} else {
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len = len_byte;
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}
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if ((size_t)(limit - p) < len) return -1;
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*tag_out = tag;
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content_out->p = p;
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content_out->len = len;
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*cursor = p + len;
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return 0;
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}
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static int pkcs8_extract_ed25519_seed_der(const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len,
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uint8_t seed_out[32]) {
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if (!der || !seed_out) return -1;
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const uint8_t *cur = der;
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const uint8_t *end = der + der_len;
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uint8_t tag;
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der_span_t outer;
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/* OneAsymmetricKey ::= SEQUENCE { version INTEGER, privateKeyAlgorithm
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* AlgorithmIdentifier, privateKey OCTET STRING, ... } */
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if (der_next(&cur, end, &tag, &outer) != 0 || tag != 0x30) return -1;
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const uint8_t *cur2 = outer.p;
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const uint8_t *limit2 = outer.p + outer.len;
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/* version INTEGER -- skip, don't care about the value */
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der_span_t version;
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if (der_next(&cur2, limit2, &tag, &version) != 0 || tag != 0x02) return -1;
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/* privateKeyAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { OID, params OPTIONAL } */
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der_span_t algid;
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if (der_next(&cur2, limit2, &tag, &algid) != 0 || tag != 0x30) return -1;
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const uint8_t *cur3 = algid.p;
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const uint8_t *limit3 = algid.p + algid.len;
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der_span_t oid;
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if (der_next(&cur3, limit3, &tag, &oid) != 0 || tag != 0x06) return -1;
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static const uint8_t ED25519_OID[3] = { 0x2B, 0x65, 0x70 }; /* 1.3.101.112 */
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if (oid.len != sizeof(ED25519_OID) ||
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memcmp(oid.p, ED25519_OID, sizeof(ED25519_OID)) != 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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/* privateKey ::= OCTET STRING, whose content is itself a DER-encoded
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* OCTET STRING (RFC 8410's CurvePrivateKey) wrapping the raw 32-byte
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* seed -- double-wrapped, confirmed empirically against a real
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* openssl-generated key (2026-08-26), not assumed from the RFC text
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* alone: `04 22 04 20 <32 bytes>` (outer OCTET STRING len=34,
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* containing inner OCTET STRING len=32). */
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der_span_t outer_octet;
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if (der_next(&cur2, limit2, &tag, &outer_octet) != 0 || tag != 0x04) return -1;
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const uint8_t *cur4 = outer_octet.p;
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const uint8_t *limit4 = outer_octet.p + outer_octet.len;
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der_span_t inner_octet;
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if (der_next(&cur4, limit4, &tag, &inner_octet) != 0 || tag != 0x04) return -1;
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if (inner_octet.len != 32) return -1;
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memcpy(seed_out, inner_octet.p, 32);
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return 0;
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}
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int pkcs8_extract_ed25519_seed(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len,
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uint8_t seed_out[32]) {
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if (!data || !seed_out) return -1;
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/* `openssl genpkey`'s default output is PEM, not raw DER -- accept
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* either. A PEM block always starts with "-----BEGIN" somewhere near
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* the top; anything else is assumed to already be raw DER. */
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if (memmem(data, data_len, "-----BEGIN", 10) != NULL) {
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size_t der_len = 0;
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uint8_t *der = pem_to_der(data, data_len, &der_len);
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if (!der) return -1;
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int rc = pkcs8_extract_ed25519_seed_der(der, der_len, seed_out);
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free(der);
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return rc;
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}
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return pkcs8_extract_ed25519_seed_der(data, data_len, seed_out);
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}
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