Phase 8 C (2/n): expand cert storage; NVRAM persistence crashed, reverted
Cert storage expanded from the old 16-byte placeholder to a real 32-byte seed + 32-byte pubkey. vm_zuse_cert_install() now has a kernel-side duplicate in src/starkernel/vm/vm_core.c -- the kernel build's VM_EXCLUDE list drops src/vm.c entirely (same reason vm_set_base() already has two independent copies), so the hosted-only version added earlier this session was never actually linked into the kernel. FORTH-side ZUSE-CERT-LO@/HI@ replaced with ZUSE-PUBKEY@ (i -- u) over the public half only; ACL-ZUSE-BOOT now checks ZUSE-CERT-INSTALLED? before authenticating instead of unconditionally. Attempted NVRAM-based persistence (GetVariable/SetVariable) for the first-boot mint flow: page-faulted inside OVMF's variable service (CR2 in the flash MMIO window). Moving the call site to match the one proven-safe existing SetVariable call site in this codebase produced the identical crash -- not a timing issue. Localized with debug markers (one boot): GetVariable works; SetVariable with real data never returns. The existing "working" precedent call is actually a delete-of-nonexistent-variable (size=0, data=NULL), a cheaper path that never touches flash, so it proved nothing about real writes. Root cause: this kernel's VMM never maps the region OVMF's variable service needs for real flash writes -- a genuine gap in UEFI runtime- services support, not Zuse-specific, and not obviously fixable in a 3-arch-uniform way (flash window location is firmware/arch-specific). Independently, storing the raw seed in RUNTIME_ACCESS NVRAM would have been a real security defect regardless of the crash -- readable by any later-loaded UEFI app or the booted OS. Reverted to a known-safe state: all NVRAM/mint code removed from kernel_main.c, init.4th's ACL.4th line back to its documented commented-out default. Verified clean compile and clean boot on all three architectures. Cert storage expansion (the part that works) stays. A dedicated system-identity disk (virtio-blk, already proven for writes via Artemis) is the recommended next substrate -- not yet decided or built. Full investigation documented in FABRIC-3.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U14ET9CWAtbQMbYqomKgXd
This commit is contained in:
Robert Allan James
co-authored by
Claude Sonnet 5
Claude Sonnet 5
parent
f223a31cec
commit
e5cbc71f46
+51
@@ -475,6 +475,57 @@ decisions get added here, not to `FABRIC-2.md`. Follow the same discipline `FABR
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first-boot mint-vs-already-minted boot sequence using `SetVariable`/`GetVariable`, and the
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`MINT` word itself.
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**Cert struct expanded (2026-08-26):** `vm_zuse_cert_install()` (both `src/vm.c`'s hosted
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copy and a new kernel-side duplicate in `src/starkernel/vm/vm_core.c` -- the kernel build's
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`VM_EXCLUDE` list drops `src/vm.c` entirely, same reason `vm_set_base()` already has two
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independent copies) now takes a real 32-byte seed + 32-byte pubkey instead of the old
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16-byte placeholder. FORTH-side `ZUSE-CERT-LO@`/`HI@` replaced with `ZUSE-PUBKEY@ ( i -- u )`
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(8-byte LE chunk `i`, 0..3, of the public half only -- the seed has no FORTH access at all).
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`ACL-ZUSE-BOOT` now checks `ZUSE-CERT-INSTALLED?` before authenticating rather than
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authenticating unconditionally. Verified: clean compile and clean boot on all three
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architectures.
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**NVRAM persistence attempt: crashed, root-caused, reverted -- do not retry as designed.**
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First attempt placed the mint-or-load `GetVariable`/`SetVariable` logic right after
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`virtio_rng_init()` (before `capsule_birth_mama()`); it page-faulted (`CR2` inside the OVMF
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flash MMIO window, a supervisor write to a not-present page) partway through boot. Moved the
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same logic to the one place in this codebase already calling `SetVariable` post-
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`ExitBootServices` successfully (`SF_VAR_REBOOT_TRIES`, much later in boot) — **identical
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crash, same RIP and CR2** — which disproved the "too early in boot" theory outright: it isn't
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a timing issue.
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**Localized precisely (advisor-directed, one boot, debug markers around each call):**
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`GetVariable` returns fine. `SetVariable` **with real 64-byte data** never returns — that's
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the exact fault site. The pre-existing `SF_VAR_REBOOT_TRIES` call that looked like a working
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precedent is actually a **delete of a variable that's never existed** (`size=0, data=NULL`) —
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a fundamentally different, much cheaper internal path than a real data write, so it proved
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nothing about real persistence being safe. **Root cause: this kernel's VMM never maps
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whatever memory region OVMF's variable service needs to actually write flash-backed variable
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data** — a real gap in UEFI runtime-services support, not specific to Zuse. Fixing it for
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real means walking the UEFI memory map for the relevant regions and mapping them into the
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kernel's own page tables, and per Section U's own note, the flash window's location is
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firmware/arch-specific (OVMF's differs from AAVMF's and EDK2-riscv64's), so "walk the map and
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map everything" is not guaranteed 3-arch-uniform even once attempted.
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**Second, independent finding (not a bug, a design flaw in the persistence choice): storing
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the raw 32-byte seed in NVRAM was a real defect regardless of the crash.** `SetVariable` was
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called with `EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS`, meaning any later-loaded UEFI application or the
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booted OS itself could read Zuse's private key straight out of NVRAM. For an irrevocable
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"one and only one Zuse, ever" root of trust, that undermines the property the design exists
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to provide — this would have needed fixing even had the crash not happened.
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**Decision needed, not yet made:** given virtio-blk writes are already proven working on all
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three architectures in this repo (`vblk_write`, Artemis's own persistence across runs), a
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dedicated file-backed system-identity disk (mirroring `disk/artemis.img`'s existing pattern,
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separate from Artemis's internal storage and separate from home-blocks USB thumbdrives) is
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the substrate with no open unknowns today — recommended over either fixing the UEFI
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flash-mapping gap (real but large, unscoped VMM work) or accepting the NVRAM approach as
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originally designed (has the exposed-seed defect regardless). Not decided or built yet.
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**Reverted to a known-safe state:** all Zuse mint/NVRAM code removed from `kernel_main.c`
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(only two harmless includes remain), `init.4th`'s `ACL.4th` line back to its documented
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commented-out default. Verified clean compile and clean boot on all three architectures in
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this reverted state.
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### From FABRIC-2.md §X, Milestone 5 — Console/VM key-match binding
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- [ ] Settle the still-open question: reuse `ACL-PIN`/`acl_allow` directly, or build a
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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# Capsule Block Manifest — Auto-generated
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<!-- Generated by mkcapsule --manifest 2026-08-26T19:15:03Z -->
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<!-- Generated by mkcapsule --manifest 2026-08-26T19:54:10Z -->
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<!-- DO NOT EDIT — re-run mkcapsule --manifest to refresh. -->
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<!-- Hand-written justifications and immutability notes live -->
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<!-- in MANIFEST.md alongside this auto-generated index. -->
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@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
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| `sdk.4th` | 5109, 5110, 5111, 5112, 5113, 5114, 5115 | `0x008fdbbb62c94a3a` |
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| `turtle.4th` | 5100, 5101, 5102, 5103, 5104, 5105, 5106, 5107, 5108 | `0x4d470418ca543365` |
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| `user-font-demo.4th` | 4200, 4201, 4202 | `0xce1fd7d1b581a56d` |
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| `zuse.4th` | 4016, 4017, 4018 | `0x097456615c8d9173` |
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| `zuse.4th` | 4016, 4017, 4018 | `0x3b31872d02a43d83` |
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## Block Map (sorted by LBN)
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@@ -103,9 +103,9 @@
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| 4006 | `ACL.4th` | `0xd781d22148ff171d` | ok |
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| 4007 | `ACL.4th` | `0xd781d22148ff171d` | ok |
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| 4015 | `ACL.4th` | `0xd781d22148ff171d` | ok |
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| 4016 | `zuse.4th` | `0x097456615c8d9173` | ok |
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| 4017 | `zuse.4th` | `0x097456615c8d9173` | ok |
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| 4018 | `zuse.4th` | `0x097456615c8d9173` | ok |
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| 4016 | `zuse.4th` | `0x3b31872d02a43d83` | ok |
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| 4017 | `zuse.4th` | `0x3b31872d02a43d83` | ok |
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| 4018 | `zuse.4th` | `0x3b31872d02a43d83` | ok |
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| 4050 | `lib.4th` | `0x1c77d7c9562a5b62` | ok |
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| 4055 | `common:msg.4th` | `0x850a0382344ea6c4` | ok |
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| 4060 | `doe-campaign.4th` | `0x3d4549142d91ec20` | ok |
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+17
-11
@@ -5,21 +5,27 @@ Block 4016
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( Loaded by ACL.4th; must not load before ACL.4th. )
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( FUTURE: Replace with thumbdrive Ed25519 PKI. )
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( HUMAN-REVIEW: capsule hash = root of superuser trust. )
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( Cert value lives in C-only VM fields (vm_zuse_cert_install),
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( NOT a dictionary CONSTANT: ACL-PIN only blocks redefinition,
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( not a >BODY-then-store, so a pinned CONSTANT is not actually
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( tamper-proof. Read with ZUSE-CERT-LO@ / ZUSE-CERT-HI@ / )
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( ZUSE-CERT-INSTALLED? -- all C primitives, all read-only. )
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( Cert (seed+pubkey) lives in C-only VM fields, installed by )
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( kernel_main.c's first-boot mint-or-load (NVRAM ZuseCert). )
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( NOT a CONSTANT: ACL-PIN blocks redefinition, not a )
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( >BODY-then-store, so a pinned CONSTANT isn't tamper-proof. )
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( Read with ZUSE-PUBKEY@ / ZUSE-CERT-INSTALLED? -- both C )
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( primitives, read-only; the seed has no FORTH access at all. )
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Block 4017
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( ACL-ZUSE-BOOT ( -- ) )
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( Authenticates zuse session (sets vm->zuse_session=1)
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( via C primitive) and pins itself against redefinition.)
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( ZUSE-AUTHENTICATE is C-only; no FORTH word grants )
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( god-mode except through this boot sequence. )
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( Only authenticates if a real cert was installed this boot -- )
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( refuses god-mode to a Zuse with no real identity behind her )
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( (no runtime services, no entropy). Pins itself against )
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( redefinition either way. ZUSE-AUTHENTICATE is C-only; no )
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( FORTH word grants god-mode except through this sequence. )
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: ACL-ZUSE-BOOT ( -- )
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ZUSE-AUTHENTICATE
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LOG-INFO" zuse: activated"
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ZUSE-CERT-INSTALLED? IF
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ZUSE-AUTHENTICATE
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LOG-INFO" zuse: activated"
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ELSE
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LOG-INFO" zuse: NOT activated -- no cert installed"
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THEN
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['] ACL-ZUSE-BOOT ACL-PIN ;
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Block 4018
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@@ -624,6 +624,13 @@ typedef void (EFIAPI *EFI_RESET_SYSTEM)(
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/* NVRAM variable names (UCS-2 string literals) */
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#define SF_VAR_BOOT_ARGS L"StarForthBootArgs"
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#define SF_VAR_REBOOT_TRIES L"StarForthRebootTries"
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#define SF_VAR_ZUSE_CERT L"StarForthZuseCert" /* 64 bytes: 32-byte Ed25519
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* seed || 32-byte pubkey.
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* Written exactly once
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* (Phase 8 first-boot mint,
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* see FABRIC-3.md) --
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* presence means the fuse
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* is already blown. */
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/* ---- BootInfo extension ------------------------------------------------ */
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#include "kernel_args.h"
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+14
-8
@@ -392,11 +392,16 @@ typedef struct VM
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uint8_t emergency_console; /**< 1 = fault handler active; bypasses all ACL checks (C-only write) */
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uint8_t zuse_session; /**< 1 = zuse authenticated at console; shows zuse)ok> prompt */
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uint8_t acl_skip; /**< 1 = skip all ACL hooks (Ananke enforcement VM; prevents recursion) */
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uint8_t zuse_cert_installed; /**< 1 = zuse_cert_lo/hi hold a real minted cert (one-time fuse) */
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uint64_t zuse_cert_lo; /**< Zuse cert value, low half. C-only write via vm_zuse_cert_install(). */
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uint64_t zuse_cert_hi; /**< Zuse cert value, high half. No FORTH word can write these fields --
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* deliberately kept out of the dictionary so ACL-PIN's redefinition-only
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* guarantee can't be bypassed via >BODY on a CONSTANT (see FABRIC-3.md). */
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uint8_t zuse_cert_installed; /**< 1 = zuse_cert_seed/pubkey hold a real minted cert (one-time fuse) */
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uint8_t zuse_cert_seed[32]; /**< Ed25519 seed, this instance's Zuse identity. C-only write via
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* vm_zuse_cert_install(); no FORTH word can read or write it --
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* the seed is the private key, never exposed past this struct. */
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uint8_t zuse_cert_pubkey[32]; /**< Ed25519 public key derived from the seed at mint time, cached
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* here so callers don't need to re-derive it. No FORTH word can
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* write it -- deliberately kept out of the dictionary so ACL-PIN's
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* redefinition-only guarantee can't be bypassed via >BODY on a
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* CONSTANT (see FABRIC-3.md). Read-only FORTH access via
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* ZUSE-PUBKEY@. */
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/** @} */
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/** @name Dictionary Management
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@@ -631,10 +636,11 @@ cell_t* vm_dictionary_get_data_field(DictEntry* entry);
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void vm_compile_word(VM* vm, DictEntry* entry);
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/* Zuse cert one-time install (blows the fuse). Returns 0 on success, -1 if
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* already installed -- a second call is a caller bug, not a runtime error to
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/* Zuse cert one-time install (blows the fuse). seed and pubkey are each 32
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* bytes, copied into the VM struct. Returns 0 on success, -1 if already
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* installed -- a second call is a caller bug, not a runtime error to
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* recover from silently. C-only: no FORTH word wraps this. */
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int vm_zuse_cert_install(VM* vm, uint64_t lo, uint64_t hi);
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int vm_zuse_cert_install(VM* vm, const uint8_t seed[32], const uint8_t pubkey[32]);
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/* Memory management */
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void* vm_allot(VM* vm, size_t bytes);
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@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
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#error "__STARKERNEL__ must be defined for kernel build"
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#endif
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#include <string.h>
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#include "uefi.h"
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#include "console.h"
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#include "arch.h"
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@@ -65,6 +66,7 @@ EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES *g_sk_runtime_services = NULL;
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#include "starkernel/pci.h"
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#include "starkernel/virtio_blk.h"
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#include "starkernel/virtio_rng.h"
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#include "starkernel/ed25519.h"
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#include "starkernel/virtio_input.h"
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#include "starkernel/xhci_driver.h"
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#include "block_subsystem.h"
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@@ -266,6 +266,22 @@ void vm_set_base(VM* vm, unsigned b)
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vm->base = (cell_t)b; /* host mirror */
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}
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/* Kernel-side copy of src/vm.c's vm_zuse_cert_install() -- the kernel
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* build excludes src/vm.c entirely (VM_EXCLUDE in Makefile.starkernel;
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* see vm_set_base() above for the same duplication pattern already
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* established), so any src/vm.c function the kernel needs to call gets
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* its own copy here. See src/vm.c's version for the full rationale
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* (why this is a VM struct field with no FORTH word, not a CONSTANT). */
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int vm_zuse_cert_install(VM* vm, const uint8_t seed[32], const uint8_t pubkey[32])
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{
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if (!vm) return -1;
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if (vm->zuse_cert_installed) return -1;
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memcpy(vm->zuse_cert_seed, seed, 32);
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memcpy(vm->zuse_cert_pubkey, pubkey, 32);
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vm->zuse_cert_installed = 1;
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return 0;
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}
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/* ====================== VM init / teardown ======================= */
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void vm_cleanup(VM* vm)
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{
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@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ void vm_set_base(VM* vm, unsigned b)
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/* vm_tick* and heartbeat functions moved to vm_time.c */
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/**
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* @brief One-time write of the Zuse cert value (blows the fuse).
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* @brief One-time write of the Zuse cert (seed + derived pubkey) -- blows
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* the fuse.
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*
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* Deliberately not backed by a dictionary CONSTANT: ACL-PIN only blocks
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* redefinition (vm_create_word shadowing), not a >BODY-then-store on the
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@@ -127,17 +128,17 @@ void vm_set_base(VM* vm, unsigned b)
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* corresponding FORTH store word closes that path entirely -- see
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* FABRIC-3.md's Milestone 4 mint-then-pin writeup for the finding.
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*
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* @param vm VM instance.
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* @param lo Cert value, low half.
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* @param hi Cert value, high half.
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* @return 0 on success; -1 if already installed (fuse already blown).
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* @param vm VM instance.
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* @param seed Ed25519 seed, 32 bytes (the private identity).
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* @param pubkey Ed25519 public key derived from seed, 32 bytes.
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* @return 0 on success; -1 if already installed (fuse already blown).
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*/
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int vm_zuse_cert_install(VM* vm, uint64_t lo, uint64_t hi)
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int vm_zuse_cert_install(VM* vm, const uint8_t seed[32], const uint8_t pubkey[32])
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{
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if (!vm) return -1;
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if (vm->zuse_cert_installed) return -1;
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vm->zuse_cert_lo = lo;
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vm->zuse_cert_hi = hi;
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memcpy(vm->zuse_cert_seed, seed, 32);
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memcpy(vm->zuse_cert_pubkey, pubkey, 32);
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vm->zuse_cert_installed = 1;
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -793,17 +793,31 @@ static void starforth_word_zuse_authenticate(VM *vm)
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vm->zuse_session = 1;
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}
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/* ZUSE-CERT-LO@ ( -- lo ) Read-only: no FORTH store word exists or should
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* exist -- the cert is written exactly once, in C, via vm_zuse_cert_install(). */
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static void starforth_word_zuse_cert_lo_fetch(VM *vm)
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/* ZUSE-PUBKEY@ ( i -- u ) Read-only: fetch 8-byte little-endian chunk i
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* (0..3) of Zuse's 32-byte Ed25519 public key as one cell. Out-of-range i
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* pushes 0 and sets vm->error rather than faulting. No FORTH word can
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* write these bytes or read the seed -- the cert is written exactly once,
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* in C, via vm_zuse_cert_install(); this is a read-only window onto the
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* PUBLIC half only. */
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static void starforth_word_zuse_pubkey_fetch(VM *vm)
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{
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vm_push(vm, (cell_t)vm->zuse_cert_lo);
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}
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/* ZUSE-CERT-HI@ ( -- hi ) See ZUSE-CERT-LO@. */
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static void starforth_word_zuse_cert_hi_fetch(VM *vm)
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{
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vm_push(vm, (cell_t)vm->zuse_cert_hi);
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if (vm->dsp < 0) {
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log_message(LOG_ERROR, "ZUSE-PUBKEY@: stack underflow");
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vm->error = 1;
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return;
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}
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cell_t i = vm_pop(vm);
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if (i < 0 || i > 3) {
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vm_push(vm, 0);
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vm->error = 1;
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return;
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}
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const uint8_t *p = &vm->zuse_cert_pubkey[i * 8];
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cell_t chunk = 0;
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for (int b = 7; b >= 0; b--) {
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chunk = (chunk << 8) | (cell_t)p[b];
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}
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vm_push(vm, chunk);
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}
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/* ZUSE-CERT-INSTALLED? ( -- flag ) -1 if the one-time cert fuse has been
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@@ -846,8 +860,7 @@ void register_starforth_words(VM* vm)
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register_word(vm, "RANDOM", starforth_word_random);
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register_word(vm, "WAIT", starforth_word_wait);
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register_word(vm, "ZUSE-AUTHENTICATE", starforth_word_zuse_authenticate);
|
||||
register_word(vm, "ZUSE-CERT-LO@", starforth_word_zuse_cert_lo_fetch);
|
||||
register_word(vm, "ZUSE-CERT-HI@", starforth_word_zuse_cert_hi_fetch);
|
||||
register_word(vm, "ZUSE-PUBKEY@", starforth_word_zuse_pubkey_fetch);
|
||||
register_word(vm, "ZUSE-CERT-INSTALLED?", starforth_word_zuse_cert_installed_query);
|
||||
register_word(vm, "HEARTBEAT-TICKS@", starforth_word_heartbeat_ticks);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -867,8 +880,7 @@ void register_starforth_words(VM* vm)
|
||||
register_word(vm, "RANDOM", starforth_word_random);
|
||||
register_word(vm, "WAIT", starforth_word_wait);
|
||||
register_word(vm, "ZUSE-AUTHENTICATE", starforth_word_zuse_authenticate);
|
||||
register_word(vm, "ZUSE-CERT-LO@", starforth_word_zuse_cert_lo_fetch);
|
||||
register_word(vm, "ZUSE-CERT-HI@", starforth_word_zuse_cert_hi_fetch);
|
||||
register_word(vm, "ZUSE-PUBKEY@", starforth_word_zuse_pubkey_fetch);
|
||||
register_word(vm, "ZUSE-CERT-INSTALLED?", starforth_word_zuse_cert_installed_query);
|
||||
register_word(vm, "HEARTBEAT-TICKS@", starforth_word_heartbeat_ticks);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user