04cc17920e8192c30e9c85abc6ba446cd79e24f0
9
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Claude
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d6895bdd15 |
Move vocabulary and control-flow state off file-scope statics onto VM
proof/FINDINGS.md's Isabelle/HOL word-source sweep (§1) found the two defects severe enough to actively corrupt the live Tripod multi-VM fleet: file-scope C statics standing in for state that belongs on struct VM. - vocabulary_words.c (highest severity in the sweep): forth_vocab/ context_vocab/current_vocab, context_var_addr/current_var_addr, the ctx_fc/forth_fc first-char search index, and the `initialized` guard were all process-wide statics. Only the first VM to touch any vocabulary word ever ran setup; every VM after that silently shared VM #1's dictionary-chain pointers and reused VM #1's byte-offset addresses as if valid in its own vm->memory. One VM's VOCABULARY/ DEFINITIONS/FORTH silently changed where every other VM looked up and defined words. - control_words.c: cf_stack/cf_sp/cf_last_mode (IF/THEN/BEGIN/DO/CASE compile-time nesting) and the LEAVE/ENDOF patch-site bookkeeping (leave_addrs/leave_sp/leave_mark_*, endof_addrs/endof_sp/endof_mark_*) were also process-wide statics. Two VMs compiling colon definitions at overlapping times would corrupt each other's nesting state. Both moved onto struct VM, following the existing hold_addr/hold_pos precedent in include/vm.h ("lives in each VM's own memory... so child VMs never alias Hera's buffer"): - New VocabularyState struct (vm->vocab): chain heads, VM-cell addresses, first-char index, initialized flag. - New ControlFlowState struct (vm->cf): cf_stack/cf_sp/cf_last_mode plus the LEAVE/ENDOF patch-site stacks. cf_tag_t/cf_item_t/CF_STACK_MAX moved from control_words.c into include/vm.h since they're now part of the struct VM field's type. - Sentinel fields (-1/-999, meaning "empty") explicitly initialized in both vm_init_with_host() implementations (hosted src/vm_bootstrap.c and kernel src/starkernel/vm/vm_bootstrap.c) alongside the existing dsp/rsp = -1 initialization, since the preceding zero-init leaves them at 0 rather than their empty sentinel. Every word function in both files already took VM *vm, so no call sites outside these two files needed to change; cf_push_item/cf_pop_item/ cf_peek_item gained a VM* parameter to reach vm->cf. Verified: hosted (amd64) and kernel (amd64, __STARKERNEL__) both build clean with -Wall -Werror after a full clean rebuild (struct VM's layout changed size, and this Makefile has no header-dependency tracking, so a stale incremental build would have linked mismatched object layouts). Hosted POST suite 1012/1012 passing (0 regressions). Manually exercised VOCABULARY/DEFINITIONS/FORTH/ORDER, and IF/ELSE, DO/LOOP/LEAVE, BEGIN/WHILE/REPEAT, and CASE/OF/ENDOF/ENDCASE (including nested DO with I/J) in the REPL -- all correct and unchanged from pre-refactor behavior. Note: a pre-existing CASE/ENDCASE default-clause bug (the code after the last OF...ENDOF pair does not correctly become the "default" value once DROP runs) was found while testing this refactor and confirmed present on unmodified master too -- not touched here, out of scope for this pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014Qf6YcnHgaEtEygq3knx19 |
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Claude
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c36bd99e1e |
Fix EXECUTE/?/DUMP/TYPE/DECIMAL-HEX-OCTAL/ALIGN defects from proof sweep
proof/FINDINGS.md's Isabelle/HOL word-source sweep (§4) flagged five real defects; this fixes all five and records resolution in that doc: - EXECUTE (system_words.c): cast a popped cell straight to a DictEntry* and called through it with only a null check. Now validates via a new shared vm_dict_entry_ok(), promoted out of starforth_words.c's ENTROPY@/ENTROPY! guard (dictionary_management.c) so EXECUTE gets the same live-entry check. - ? and DUMP (format_words.c): dereferenced the popped cell as a raw host pointer, bypassing vm_addr_ok entirely (out-of-VM-bounds read). Both now go through VM_ADDR/vm_addr_ok/vm_load_cell/vm_ptr like every other memory word (@, `,`, editor_words.c). - TYPE (io_words.c): bounds check computed addr+count in signed 64-bit arithmetic, which can overflow and bypass the check on large operands. Replaced with vm_addr_ok(), which is written to avoid that overflow. - DECIMAL/HEX/OCTAL (format_words.c): wrote only the BASE memory cell, never vm->base, the host-mirror field number-output words actually read via current_base() -- so these words silently affected number parsing but never printing. Now call the existing vm_set_base() (previously only used at boot init), which updates both. vm_get_base/vm_set_base promoted to public declarations in include/vm.h. - ALIGN vs ALLOT/,/C,/2, (dictionary_words.c): disagreed on dictionary growth ceiling (2MB vs 5MB). Investigated which was correct rather than blindly widening: vm_get_block_addr() maps block N to vm->memory + N*BLOCK_SIZE across the full 5MB arena, and USER_BLOCKS_START (block 2048) lines up exactly with DICTIONARY_MEMORY_SIZE -- so ALLOT/,/C,/2, letting `here` grow past 2MB could silently corrupt live block/user data sharing that memory. Tightened ALLOT/,/C,/2, to DICTIONARY_MEMORY_SIZE to match ALIGN. Verified: hosted (amd64) and kernel (amd64, __STARKERNEL__) both build clean with -Wall -Werror; hosted POST suite 1012/1012 passing (0 regressions); manually exercised EXECUTE, ?/DUMP, TYPE, HEX/DECIMAL/OCTAL, and large-ALLOT rejection in the REPL. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014Qf6YcnHgaEtEygq3knx19 |
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Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5
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b031b802e3 |
Rename FABRIC series: FABRIC.md->0, FABRIC-2.md->1, FABRIC-3.md->2, FABRIC-4.md unchanged
FABRIC.md -> FABRIC-0.md FABRIC-2.md -> FABRIC-1.md FABRIC-3.md -> FABRIC-2.md (the current/living document) FABRIC-4.md unchanged (new #3 to follow separately) Every cross-reference repo-wide updated to match, including doc-comment citations inside kernel source (.c/.h) files -- done via an ordered placeholder substitution (FABRIC-3.md->placeholder2, FABRIC-2.md-> placeholder1, FABRIC.md->placeholder0, then placeholders resolved to final names) in a single pass per file to avoid double-shifting already-renamed references. One line in capsules/font.4th grew past the 64-char block-format limit as a side effect of the longer filename; shortened it and reverified with mkcapsule --lint (34/34 pass) before rebuilding. Verified 3-arch boot to ok> (amd64/aarch64/riscv64, each in the foreground) after the fix; logs and DoE CSVs from this session's verification runs included per this repo's own audit-artifact convention. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019YcT3H2PQeyujrzjqS3Var |
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Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5
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c07184e984 |
Add VMIdentity type, relocate homeblocks_sig_t off devblock 0
Phase A of the identity pipeline (FABRIC-3.md §F.2/§F.16, §F.13):
- New include/starkernel/vm_identity.h: VMIdentity{owner_pubkey[32],
installed, acl_caps}, its own header per the project's "give real-shaped
data its own header" convention (VMUuid's own precedent), embedded by
value on struct VM. acl_caps is an independent capability bitmask, not
an ordered privilege tier (decided 2026-08-28) -- Zuse isn't a
structurally special VM, her identity just has every bit set
(VM_IDENTITY_CAP_ALL). No individual capability bits assigned yet,
deliberate slack matching blk_meta_t's own acl_reserved precedent --
real bits get names once the operation they gate (BINDSTEP, MINT, ...)
actually gets built.
- Applied the devblock-1 relocation decided in §F.13: new
HOMEBLOCKS_SIG_START_FBLOCK constant (homeblocks_sig.h), repl.c's
homeblocks_sig_check() call site updated from the literal 0. Also
applied the still-owed blockmap_offset/blockmap_devblocks ->
identity_src_offset/identity_src_devblocks rename decided in §F.6 (no
other code referenced the old names). Updated the header's own stale
GPT-relative doc comments to match -- GPT was dropped permanently, this
location is final, not an interim stand-in.
Verified live on all three architectures: clean compile, clean boot to
ok>, Hermes/Artemis both confirmed live with no KILL (no regression from
last session's session-less fix). One pre-existing, unrelated anomaly
observed consistently on all three arches, not caused by this change (no
code touched here intersects Zuse's own fence-write path): "Zuse: minted
but fence write FAILED (not persistent)" -- flagged for its own
investigation, not chased here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019ZGkimpfyh63EZyRkNbkPD
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Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5
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e5cbc71f46 |
Phase 8 C (2/n): expand cert storage; NVRAM persistence crashed, reverted
Cert storage expanded from the old 16-byte placeholder to a real 32-byte seed + 32-byte pubkey. vm_zuse_cert_install() now has a kernel-side duplicate in src/starkernel/vm/vm_core.c -- the kernel build's VM_EXCLUDE list drops src/vm.c entirely (same reason vm_set_base() already has two independent copies), so the hosted-only version added earlier this session was never actually linked into the kernel. FORTH-side ZUSE-CERT-LO@/HI@ replaced with ZUSE-PUBKEY@ (i -- u) over the public half only; ACL-ZUSE-BOOT now checks ZUSE-CERT-INSTALLED? before authenticating instead of unconditionally. Attempted NVRAM-based persistence (GetVariable/SetVariable) for the first-boot mint flow: page-faulted inside OVMF's variable service (CR2 in the flash MMIO window). Moving the call site to match the one proven-safe existing SetVariable call site in this codebase produced the identical crash -- not a timing issue. Localized with debug markers (one boot): GetVariable works; SetVariable with real data never returns. The existing "working" precedent call is actually a delete-of-nonexistent-variable (size=0, data=NULL), a cheaper path that never touches flash, so it proved nothing about real writes. Root cause: this kernel's VMM never maps the region OVMF's variable service needs for real flash writes -- a genuine gap in UEFI runtime- services support, not Zuse-specific, and not obviously fixable in a 3-arch-uniform way (flash window location is firmware/arch-specific). Independently, storing the raw seed in RUNTIME_ACCESS NVRAM would have been a real security defect regardless of the crash -- readable by any later-loaded UEFI app or the booted OS. Reverted to a known-safe state: all NVRAM/mint code removed from kernel_main.c, init.4th's ACL.4th line back to its documented commented-out default. Verified clean compile and clean boot on all three architectures. Cert storage expansion (the part that works) stays. A dedicated system-identity disk (virtio-blk, already proven for writes via Artemis) is the recommended next substrate -- not yet decided or built. Full investigation documented in FABRIC-3.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U14ET9CWAtbQMbYqomKgXd |
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Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5
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6f5605d479 |
Phase 8: zuse cert storage moved out of the dictionary (fuse-blow install)
Found that a pinned CONSTANT is not actually tamper-proof: ACL-PIN only blocks redefinition, not a >BODY-then-store on the word's existing data field. Moves the Zuse cert value into C-only VM struct fields (zuse_cert_lo/hi + zuse_cert_installed fuse bit) with a one-time vm_zuse_cert_install() and read-only ZUSE-CERT-LO@/HI@/INSTALLED? FORTH accessors, closing the tamper path structurally instead of by convention. Deletes the now-insecure ZUSE-CERT-LO/HI CONSTANT words from zuse.4th. vm_zuse_cert_install() has no caller yet -- the real mint flow (Milestone 6 CA, the MINT word) is still open; this is storage + accessors only, not a stand-in mint. Documented in FABRIC-3.md. Verified: hosted build clean, mkcapsule --lint clean (31/31), clean boot to ok> on amd64/aarch64/riscv64 with Stadium conservation intact and no panics. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U14ET9CWAtbQMbYqomKgXd |
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Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5
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af267a52a6 |
Artemis Milestone 2h: hot-detach -- 2h complete
blk_subsys_detach_device() (block_subsystem.c) walks the device chain, refuses removal of anything but the current tail (a mid-chain removal would corrupt every later slot's start_lbn -- this architecture's own doc already argues USB stays last specifically to avoid that), unlinks, shrinks total_user_lbn, closes and frees the slot. Discards rather than flushes dirty state -- the device is physically gone by the time this runs (PORTSC disconnect only). Trigger wiring mirrors the attach path: bot_msc_attached (set only once attach actually succeeds) gates a new bot_msc_detach_pending flag set at PORTSC disconnect (not Disable Slot completion, which is conditionally skipped and would miss concurrent connect/disconnect pairs), consumed in sk_repl_idle(). Advisor flagged the real hazard ahead of time: block_words.c's VM block window (blk_vm_lbn[]/blk_vm_cbuf[]) can go stale across a detach then a same-LBN re-attach, and suggested a pointer-identity re-check in blk_vm_load() as a minimal fix. That fix was implemented, then directly falsified by its own designed-for-this test: attach a blank device, read a block (populating the cache), detach, re-attach a device with distinct content at the identical LBN, read again -- served stale content from the first device. Root cause, confirmed live: glibc's allocator hands free(slot) straight back to the very next same-size calloc(), so the "fresh" and stale pointers were bitwise identical despite being two different devices. Fixed properly with a monotonic blk_subsys_epoch() counter (bumped on every attach/detach) checked by a new blk_vm_check_epoch() helper at the one choke point (blk_vm_find(), plus blk_vm_flush_all() which reads the same arrays directly) that covers every path touching the window cache -- unfooled by address reuse. Verified live with a new disk/usb-thumbdrive-test2.img fixture (distinct content from the existing blank test image): attach A, read (cache hit populated), detach, re-attach B at the same LBN, read again -- correctly ran a fresh device read and returned B's real content, not A's stale cached zeros. The failing pointer-comparison attempt's own capture log kept as evidence, not deleted. All three architectures re-verified clean. FABRIC-2.md Section X 2h marked complete -- enumeration through hot-detach all live and verified; only WRITE(10) (2g's own still-open item) remains unimplemented in the driver, not blocking anything here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CXjAPTEKrgY2Mrk25KoLDn |
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Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5
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5a28458b21 |
starkernel: item 4.2 -- Hermes native on the Stadium (complete)
Migrates Hermes's message/channel lifecycle onto the Stadium's unified heat/capacity economy: MSG-ALLOC/FREE-NODE and CH-ALLOC/FREE-NODE now route entirely through stadium_admit()/stadium_evict(), replacing the old local free-list + independent heat-field mechanism. Eight kernel-only STADIUM-* FORTH primitives (ADMIT, EVICT, RES@, RES-PULL, RES-PUSH, HEAT@, HEAT!, WORD-HEAT), VM.stadium_vm_id threaded through all three vm_core.c dispatch sites (replacing item 4.1's hardcoded vm_uuid_hera()), and the stadium_owner[idx] fix so evict-credit lands in the VM that actually admitted a patron, not whoever owned cell 0. This session's own contribution, on top of that pre-existing implementation: found and fixed two bugs blocking the item's own K≡1.0 conservation self-check (HERMES-K was reading 0, not 65536): - Q.SLOT admission-heat fix (capsules/hermes/init.4th): MSG-SEND/ CH-ACCEPT admitted with Q.1 (the entire fleet-wide "1.0" unit) per item, a leftover from before the Stadium migration when each message/channel had its own unconstrained heat field. Instantly drained the shared, finite reservoir. - Reservoir floor for word-execution admission (stadium_words.c): stadium_word_dispatch() (item 4.1) pulls STADIUM_WORD_HEAT_QUANTUM on every word dispatch, not just first admission -- exhausts a VM's entire reservoir in ~32 dispatches, starving any application-level economy sharing that VM's reservoir before it gets a chance to pull anything. word_dispatch_pull() now clamps word-execution's own pulls to leave a Q48_ONE/3 floor (same fair-share figure COMMON-CH's own floor already uses); application-level pulls are unaffected. - STADIUM-WORD-HEAT primitive + stadium_words_resident_heat(): the floor deliberately leaves word-execution residents holding real heat, invisible to HERMES-K's original formula (MSG+CH+reservoir, no term for word patrons). Adding this term closes K to exactly 65536 on all three architectures. Also rules on two open scope questions in FABRIC.md: MBR-ALLOC/ MBR-FREE-NODE stay off the Stadium (membership records have no heat field, never did -- the acceptance bullet's inclusion of them was a completeness gesture predating a check of the actual layout), and records the effort number (12 implementation files, +759/-120 lines). Verified: all three architectures boot clean, full self-test passes, Stadium conservation closes exactly (resident_sum + reservoir = Q48_ONE) at both the C/Stadium level and the FORTH-level HERMES-K check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Robert Allan James
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a5ed8c3d87 | Initial commit — LithosAnanke kernel |